THIS & THAT CONSORTIUM

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Introduction

As I sit down to write this, I should probably admit right away that I haven't even decided on a proper title for the document you're currently reading, nor do I have the faintest idea of the exact shape it will eventually take, or even where it might end up once I'm finished with it. What I do know, however, is that I woke up today with a rather heavy and bitter kind of disdain pressing against my chest, one of those moods that makes you feel the need to spill words out simply for the sake of relieving the weight. So I began ranting, almost aimlessly at first, letting the first subjects that drifted into my head form the backbone of what would later be written down here. Only afterward did I make the effort to reorganize it, polish it up, and arrange it into something that at least passes for coherent, though, let's be honest, it is still very much a rant at its core.

The main body of this document, as it currently stands, is essentially a collection of definitions, commentaries, and reflections on a handful of themes that have been circling around my mind lately. Namely: the concept I call *national schizophrenia*, the process of *renativisation*, and then the familiar modern plagues of *slop* and *degeneracy*. Alongside those, I've also written at length about my rejection of the popular belief that "struggle is the point of life," a topic that I ended up debating with a friend not too long ago, and I found it worthwhile enough to commit my position to writing, especially because it ties neatly into how I see younger generations behaving online, though that connection, obvious as it seems to me, is apparently invisible to some.

Now, I won't pretend that this document has some grand thesis or unifying point. It doesn't. I'm not writing for a university, or for an academic journal, or for any institution at all. I write because I rant, and I rant because it's the only way I can get certain thoughts out of my system. The fact that I bothered to dress it up, refine it, and package it into something resembling a complete text is more out of habit than design. So if you're looking for a grand conclusion, a polished manifesto, or some carefully constructed treatise, you won't find it here. What you will find is me ranting about the things that weigh on me. If that interests you, then you're welcome to read on and take from it whatever you will.

National Schizophrenia

National schizophrenia is what I would call a phenomenon where a country or nation, having suffered some sort of deep historical trauma, be it war, occupation, or any comparable event, loses the ability to properly assess the actual reality of its present geopolitical situation. On its own, this kind of collective delusion is relatively rare; it usually doesn't appear in isolation but is instead bound up with other, often more questionable, geopolitical goals. The narrative of national schizophrenia, then, becomes a convenient tool of justification, a rhetorical device used by governments and elites to support policies that might otherwise appear baseless or incoherent. Take, for example, the case of Russophobia in the Baltics and in Poland. Yes, of course, there is a long and painful history between these regions and Russia, marked by occupation, repression, and centuries of conflict. Nobody is denying that. But when you look at the present day, the active antagonization of Russia doesn't carry much concrete benefit for these countries. It's not as though they are poised to gain territory, wealth, or security by provoking Russia directly. If there *were* such tangible goals, if antagonism meant a shot at recovering lost land, or securing an economic advantage, then the 'schizophrenic' narrative could at least be dressed up in sensible justifications. But the cases where national schizophrenia shows its 'purest' form, so to speak, are precisely those moments where antagonism is pursued despite there being no realistic end goal or material gain to be had.

So why does this antagonism persist? The explanation is twofold. On the one hand, the political class, those in government, loyal to the Western geopolitical order, see Russia as an enemy of American unipolarity and therefore willingly play their part in weakening it. That is the rational, strategic dimension. On the other hand, the average person in Poland or the Baltics doesn't necessarily perceive this wider geopolitical logic. For them, it is something simpler: an instinctive, emotional hatred of Russia rooted in historical grievances. They support confrontation not out of a calculation of interests but simply because they *don't like* Russia and want to see it diminished, regardless of the consequences. And it is precisely here that national schizophrenia becomes useful to the elites: it gives them a ready-made emotional narrative to rally the masses behind their larger strategic projects. Poland in particular offers a striking case. Poland no longer even borders Russia in a

meaningful way (Kaliningrad is hardly an existential threat), and Ukraine does not serve as any sort of protective buffer since Belarus and Russia are tightly integrated militarily. There are no territorial or financial rewards Poland can realistically secure by antagonising Russia. And yet, because of the schizophrenic cycle, where historical grudges are endlessly revived and emotional animosity is kept alive, Poland continues its hostile posture. The result is a self-perpetuating antagonism, one that brings little direct benefit to Poland itself but serves the wider geopolitical interests of the West.

At this point, someone might object: *well, wouldn't your push for action against Ukraine count as national schizophrenia as well?* And the answer is: precisely, but also not quite. It's complicated. As I've already laid out, there is no tangible goal or benefit for Poland in antagonising Russia; the elites exploit anti-Russian national schizophrenia to keep Poland loyal to the Western bloc. What I propose is admittedly similar in method, using a nationally schizophrenic narrative, but my aim is different, because I tie it to an actual tangible outcome: the return of Eastern Galicia to Poland and, more broadly, a geopolitical realignment of Poland away from the suffocating grip of Western elites through a closer partnership with Russia. So yes, the whole "never forget the Volhynian genocide" line *is* an example of national schizophrenia. And yet, paradoxically, it is not of much personal or historical importance to me. My family was involved in those events, so I naturally carry a personal dislike of Ukrainians because of it, but at the end of the day the Volhynian genocide simply isn't that central to Polish history, and even less to its present geopolitical situation. I invoke it, quite openly, as a narrative weapon: I push that schizophrenic framing not for the sake of empty antagonism, but as a means to achieve what I see as concrete national benefits, unlike the Polish government, whose use of schizophrenia primarily serves Western interests rather than Polish ones.

Now, of course, one might ask: what actually counts as national schizophrenia, and what does not? That's up for debate, but that's also the point of concepts like this, they aren't rigid scientific categories but words that help us describe patterns we see. If you can point to a country acting against its own interest due to some unresolved trauma of the past, then the label "national schizophrenia" becomes a shorthand that captures the dynamic without the need for a long-winded explanation. It's also worth noting that national schizophrenia can emerge from

both the top and the bottom. It always exists to some degree among ordinary people, because it's perfectly natural to dislike or distrust a nation that once wronged yours. But if it stays confined to that level, just as private resentment, it has little impact. So what if a segment of the population dislikes a foreign country? The worst consequence is fewer tourists or less trade, hardly the collapse of society. In this limited sense, national schizophrenia is not 'evil' per se; it's simply a human phenomenon, the natural tendency to hold grudges. But once it gets instrumentalized, when old grudges are mobilised in ways that prevent a country from pursuing tangible benefits in the present, then it becomes a problem.

And this, really, is why the term matters. It lets us call out those moments when past traumas override present opportunities. It gives us a way to say, succinctly, "this is just national schizophrenia," without needing to launch into an elaborate critique every time. Still, even if it is not inherently evil, national schizophrenia is hardly a virtue either. There's no real psychological benefit in it, no constructive role it plays in the life of a nation. Belonging to a national collective is based on deeper, internal factors like shared blood, culture, history, and loyalty. Simply disliking another nation cannot serve as a foundation for unity, it's too fragile and too negative to sustain identity. At best, such animosity can serve as a glue for temporary alliances, but even there, it is shallow and opportunistic. In the long run, a nation defined by who it hates rather than who it is will always be weaker.

Renativisation

Renativisation, as a concept, is deceptively simple; its complexity emerges only when one attempts to put it into practice. At its core, renativisation, a term deliberately constructed from “Re-,” “native,” and “-isation”, refers to the deliberate reconstruction of a nation’s present reality in a way that imagines what might have unfolded had foreign influences not altered its culture, language, or social fabric. Importantly, it is neither a blind return to a historical past nor an uncritical embrace of contemporary developments. Rather, it seeks a careful balance: retaining the lessons and natural evolution of history while removing or mitigating external impositions that have disrupted the society’s native trajectory. The underlying goal is to produce a reality that feels authentic to the people who belong to that culture, rather than one imposed from outside or artificially constructed. Renativisation explicitly rejects reactionary thinking. It does not advocate for restoring a specific previous state of affairs because such a restoration would ignore the value of societal evolution, which occurs through trial, error, and organic adaptation. At the same time, it stands in opposition to globalization, progressivism, and modernism, or at least the forms of these ideologies that act as conduits for foreign influence, on the grounds that they distort the natural development of nations. From the perspective of renativisation, these external forces impose alien values, aesthetics, or institutional frameworks that may disrupt the society’s internal logic, resulting in a deviation from the path it might have naturally followed. The presence of these distortions creates not only cultural inauthenticity but also social and political vulnerabilities, since societies that are internally coherent are stronger and more resilient.

In practical terms, renativisation can be described as a kind of alternate traditionalism. Even changes that are deeply entrenched in contemporary traditions, whether linguistic shifts, artistic norms, or social practices, can be considered inauthentic if they originated primarily through external influence. We do not simply wish to “turn back the clock”; rather, imagine an alternate present in which historical injustices of cultural meddling are rectified, a present that is organically aligned with the society’s internal tendencies rather than imposed models. While comparisons are often drawn between renativisation and

palingenesis, I reject the label, because palingenesis is broad, abstract, and often associated with modernist frameworks that renativisation explicitly critiques. Renativisation is not inherently limited to state-level actors or elites; it can be pursued by individuals, communities, or even subcultures. Indeed, a bottom-up approach might be more effective in many cases, as grassroots movements can experiment with cultural authenticity without being constrained by bureaucratic inertia. Oddly enough, the closest contemporary analogues I've observed are subcultures reacting to misrepresentations of their own material, such as fandoms policing how new generations portray established characters. While this example is trivial in scale, it proves that the basic logic of renativisation, identifying perceived distortions and attempting to correct them, is feasible. The challenge at a societal level is simply far greater: culture is a complex, multifaceted system, influenced by countless forces beyond the control of any one group.

Finally, renativisation is inherently utopian. A fully realized renativised society, a state entirely free of foreign influence, is impossible, not because the goal is unworthy, but because some external influences will always exist. Pursuing total isolation, or attempting to violently expel all foreign elements, is neither practical nor desirable. Yet this impossibility does not render the ideology meaningless. Renativisation is valuable precisely as a guiding principle: it is not about achieving perfection but about striving to minimize alien distortions to the best extent possible, constantly recalibrating society toward what might be considered its authentic, organic evolution.

Slop / Degeneracy

To try and understand what “slop” really is, a word that, on the surface, seems almost trivial, yet carries a curious weight. It’s an interesting word, one that originally had a proper sense, a concrete feeling and meaning, but which, over time, has been so overused and misapplied that it risks becoming almost empty. In that sense, it bears resemblance to the concept of degeneracy, though the comparison is mostly structural: both words describe a decline or degradation, but they operate on different scales and with very different historical weight. Degeneracy, after all, is a word that has persisted for centuries, rooted in philosophical, moral, and political discourse, whereas slop, though technically extant for a long time in the language, only acquired its modern connotation relatively recently.

Defining degeneracy precisely has long been a struggle for people, because it is less a concrete object than a felt phenomenon. People experience degeneracy more than they define it; they sense it, recognize its presence in particular cases, and respond emotionally or socially to it. Yet, paradoxically, this subjective sense is exactly what forms its definitional core. If you’ve read *Natcolasis+*, you may have noticed my repeated references to sectarianism, not in the conventional sense of ideological or fractional sectarianism, but as a process of carving out groups within the national collective and elevating them to positions of collective action that rival the nation itself. This, in my framework, is deeply entwined with degeneracy. Degeneracy, in essence, is the embedding of these sectarian collectives within administration, governance, and public life, a process that undermines the cohesion of the national collective. Civilization, I would argue, is maintained by the most potent collective: the nation acting as an aggregate ego. When sectarianism is enthroned on an equal footing with the national collective, it corrodes that cohesion, and civilization begins to wither. Degeneracy, then, is civilization decaying not through external attack or random misfortune, but through the internal degradation of the national collective itself, via the elevation of factions that fracture collective purpose.

This is where the principle of national collectivism becomes particularly relevant. National collectivism entails the upkeep of the collective good on a utilitarian basis, which naturally means that the majority's needs may impose on minority preferences, but only insofar as this promotes overall societal benefit. There is no place for the sectarian interest of one group being elevated over another, because that is degeneracy in itself. For example, taxes might be levied on the very rich to redistribute resources to the majority, a classic case of utilitarian collectivism. But that same principle would not justify the eradication of a local dialect, because the dialect, is not harmful, even if it does not provide tangible benefit to the majority. The deliberate eradication of such a dialect would represent the sectarian interests of the group opposed to it being placed above the collective good, requiring unnecessary allocation of resources and thus constituting degeneracy. In other words, degeneracy is not merely about harm or neglect; it is about the misplacement of priority, the elevation of factional or arbitrary goals over what maintains and strengthens the national collective.

Slop, by contrast, is conceptually simpler, though no less interesting. Its meaning has eroded in two stages: first, through overcomplication, and second, through the oversimplification of that overcomplication, leaving the word largely hollow in casual use. Slop, at its core, is excess manufactured beyond necessity, not merely inefficiency, but purposeless, detrimental abundance. I discussed this with a friend once, and a clear illustration emerged: fast food is slop, but not merely because it is unhealthy or quick. It becomes slop because it is engineered to manipulate, to addict, to compel repeated consumption in the pursuit of trivial gains, the tiny profit margin that results from subtly coaxing people to return more often than they otherwise would. Convenience or speed alone does not make something slop; it is the deliberate, needless harm paired with trivial, avoidable objectives that defines slop. In other words, slop is purposeless production that prioritizes exploitation over genuine utility or necessity.

In both cases, degeneracy and slop, we are observing the consequences of excess or misalignment, but on different planes. Degeneracy is a social, structural, and political phenomenon: the decay of a collective through internal mismanagement

and the elevation of partial interests. Slop is cultural, industrial, and behavioral: the decay of production and consumption through the creation of excess without purpose. Both words have lost clarity through overuse, yet they retain their power if we take the time to peel back their modern, degraded surfaces and examine the mechanisms behind them. National collectivism provides a lens through which we can distinguish the productive exercise of collective power from the corrosive influence of factionalism, highlighting precisely why degeneracy is a threat, and why slop, though smaller in scale, can still illustrate the same principle in cultural life.

Struggle cult

Viewing struggle as the point of life is fundamentally false. It's a nonsensical conception that exists only to romanticize suffering, to make the unavoidable pain inflicted upon people appear meaningful. I know that might sound harsh, but it's necessary to confront this honestly. Some attempt to justify struggle from a biological or evolutionary perspective, diving into the gritty mechanisms of stress, adaptation, or survival. Fine, that's one way to analyze life. But such a view is essentially anti-humanist. And while you are free to hold anti-humanist perspectives, applying them to human organization; politics, society, the structuring of civilization, is entirely nonsensical. It's like walking into a McDonald's and explaining how to run a charity: irrelevant, ineffective, and ultimately useless. Politics is about human organization, and if your worldview fundamentally ignores human needs, you have nothing useful to contribute. At its core, society has to grapple with a simple truth: people either need a reason to live, or they must be forced to live. Struggle, in itself, is not a reason, it's a coercive mechanism. It can keep people alive, sure, but it simultaneously corrodes the psyche. This is precisely how we end up with masses of mentally ill individuals functioning only because the state intervenes to prevent suicide, without addressing the underlying social issues that create their despair. Alternatively, one could argue, "If someone wants to die, let them." In principle, yes, that might make sense ethically. But good luck organizing a functioning society around that principle, it would be as practical as running a cult devoted to death.

I have stumbled upon a dualistic conception of meaning in life, which is both descriptive and non-conceptual. On the most basic, practical level, life requires safety nets, structures that allow people to live with confidence in a tolerable existence, regardless of success or failure. These can be seen as three pillars: God (not a specific deity, but a spiritual anchor of some sort), nation (the collective ego of a people, which enables civilization), and love (a one-to-one support network in which two individuals are mutually invested in each other's survival and well-being). Alongside this practical layer exists a conceptual layer, a purpose I in my fictional work termed *lakhe'žic,* in my constructed language meaning "easy life." Translated into real-world terms, we can call it "collective convenience." This does not imply the elimination of all hardship, hardship is unavoidable, but the recognition of this inevitability informs the purpose. In a world where struggle is constant and unavoidable, the pursuit of struggle for its own sake is masochistic. The opposite, therefore, should be true: life's aim is to 'tug against the rope' of inherent struggle, to maximize ease and simplicity for as many people as possible. In practice, this means designing society to allow people to live comfortably, without forcing them into pointless toil, giving them a reason to enjoy the quiet, unremarkable moments of existence. In other words: a 'chill society'.

The popular mantra of "without struggle, there is no growth" is laughably absurd. What is the point of growth? Blindly worshiping growth, or even degrowth, is equally nonsensical. Growth should not be pursued as an abstract ideal; it should be pursued only when it tangibly benefits those who contribute to it. Building a house to shelter oneself from rain makes perfect sense; building additional houses simply to produce more growth, without practical need, is pointless. Collective convenience is not laziness, it is rational prioritization of effort, efficiency, and comfort. This also explains certain aspects of youth culture, particularly the embrace of anime, Internet absurdism, and losercore aesthetics. If the mere mention of these things makes someone uncomfortable, it often indicates lingering loyalty to the older generations, the very ones who ruined the economy through wealth hoarding or started movements like the hippie counterculture that destabilized social norms. Youth engaging in online absurdism, be it Wojaks, cutegore, or ironic TikTok edits, are subconsciously (or sometimes consciously) practicing a form of mass absurdism. Not absurdism in the existential sense, but

absurdism in the sense of reacting to the incoherence and tyranny of a system that simultaneously enslaves people and prevents them from opting out.

The current social structure, built on Protestant work ethic and a cult of struggle, simply does not fit the modern population. Reaction is necessary, but not reactionary, not a return to feudal hierarchies or corporate-state monopolies like NXR. Instead, a sort of renativization of global culture is needed, one that prioritizes collective convenience over forced exhaustion and pointless struggle. Failure to act will only lead to collapse, chaos, and destruction. Most of the population senses this intuitively: modern life is neither the end of history as liberal theory would claim, nor a seamless continuation of historical trends. The future is malleable. The tug-of-war toward collective convenience is the only realistic, peaceful, and slightly utopian path forward. The youth reject the cult of struggle, and their self-induced absurdism is evidence of it. This mass absurdism is a subconscious rebellion: those who have no real stake in the system but are forced to participate recognize its incoherence. They laugh, repost, and engage with irony and nonsense because it reflects the absurdity of their existence, both the absurdity of a nonsense meme and the absurdity of being compelled to participate in a life that offers little real meaning.

Is it destructive? Perhaps marginally, if judged solely by end results. But it is understandable, even necessary. It creates fertile ground for cultural evolution, with occasional brilliance and occasional disaster. In the state of the modern world, especially for the youth, this is the reality: the system is broken, the old paradigms fail, and absurdism is both symptom and response, a signal that the pursuit of collective convenience is not only desirable, but inevitable if non-chaos is to be the outcome.

Cutification

For the last thing I want to discuss (and I'm adding this post-facto, after I had already written what I thought was the conclusion), I feel compelled to address the topic of *cutification.* Not in the narrow linguistic sense of adding cutesy suffixes or baby talk, but in the broader cultural sense, essentially what is often called *kawaii culture.* Though "kawaii" is Japanese in branding, the underlying phenomenon of cutification is not inherently tied to Japan. For instance, in the West, you see things like the meowl, the stupid cat owl thing I put on the cover, though, technically, that one is of Chinese origin if I'm not mistaken. Regardless of the preciseorigin, the principle remains the same: it is the cultural elevation of cute as an aesthetic and social force. I touched on this earlier when mentioning *cutegore* in the context of the youth. It is all part of the same broad tendency: the mass, self-induced absurdism of today's younger generations. The Internet and youth culture are saturated with cuteness, it is everywhere, omnipresent, and arguably unavoidable. One of the reasons anime has such global appeal is precisely because of this: cute characters, charming visuals, a lighthearted detachment from the world of duty and struggle. There's no denying the magnetic quality of cute, because cute things are deliberately soft, non-threatening, and fundamentally *non-productive.* This is, in a way, their subversive quality. Moe, the archetype of "cute girls doing cute things", is almost militant in its rejection of grand narratives, ambition, or productivity. Its whole point is to depict "nothing," the small details of ordinary life with friends and family. But paradoxically, that nothingness becomes something: it adds soul to existence.

So what am I getting at here? Simply put, cutification is not something to scoff at or dismiss as frivolous. It is something that should be embraced, precisely because it functions as one of the few remaining forms of aesthetic resistance to the cult of struggle. The modern West, in contrast, is deliberately bland and androgynous. Its cultural products are engineered to be safe, palatable, and devoid of edges. They aim not at the individual soul but at a grey, faceless template of consumer, and for that very reason they end up pleasing no one, but also offending no one. And in this state of universal mediocrity, such aesthetics survive and proliferate, because they are efficient in monetary terms. There is nothing mystical about Japan's success in

exporting “kawaii”, they just stumbled onto it sooner than others and reaped the financial rewards (well, to the extent that piracy hasn’t drained them dry). The important point is that *kawaii is not particularist.* It is not inherently Japanese. It is a universal principle, rooted in the human craving for softness, comfort, and warmth. It appeals to something deeply embedded in the human heart, and for that reason I think it should be embraced and copied elsewhere. Of course, I am not advocating for some strong, imposed adoption of foreign styles, that would amount to self-inflicted cultural imperialism. Rather, I mean that the general principle of “cute, soft, and lovely aesthetics” is worth pursuing because it meets a universal need. Compare this to masculinist aesthetics, which are an extension of the struggle cult. They valorize muscular builds, harshness, physical effort, because that is what once mattered in agrarian and industrial societies. You needed men who could plough fields and haul steel, so you glorified that form. But today? That aesthetic is functionally dead; it serves no purpose, and trying to revive it is connected to the struggle cult . Futurism, likewise, is another dead end, nonsensical at its core, promising sleek progress that never arrives, and stripping life of warmth in the process.

Cutification, on the other hand, offers a way forward. Imagine societies where aesthetics of softness, comfort, and charm are not relegated to niche subcultures but openly embraced. Women should wear pink dresses or skirts, or, for those who dislike bright colors, jirai-kei inspired fashions with darker, melancholic tones. Men could bring back trenchcoats, stylish hats, outfits with character rather than the current endless rotation of grey hoodies and generic sneakers. It might sound trivial, but fashion is where people *could* aurafarm in a way that matters, cultivating a shared presence, soul, and identity. Instead, many posture as great leaders or revolutionary thinkers, aurafarming in their own heads, while refusing to engage in the small but real domain of everyday aesthetics. Cutification, then, is not merely superficial. It is a potential pathway to re-enchant communities, to return soul where modernity has stripped it away. And as a side note, since this connects tangentially, third spaces are vital too. The Internet has killed much of the organic pull of cafes, bars, and local haunts. People now need more than just “being out” as a reason to gather physically. They need environments that appeal,

that draw them in through aesthetics as much as through function. But that's a whole other discussion for another time.

Conclusion

So, in the end, what does all of this mean? Honestly, probably nothing in particular. Reading back over what I've written, it really does come across as a messy, incoherent swirl of ranting, but perhaps that in itself is meaningful in a small way. If I were to attempt to pin something down, I could argue, using the idea of "slop," that treating struggle as the point of life is effectively a pursuit of a slop society: a condition purposelessly harmful to everyone involved, a system designed to glorify suffering for no practical or meaningful reason. It's an absurdity that somehow gets romanticized in intellectual circles, but when you strip away the rhetoric, it's just a template for misery. One thought that struck me while writing the last section is something often repeated, yet rarely applied in practice: when imagining or designing how society should function, you should always try to view yourself as the most ordinary, average person, never the leader. The person in charge, the one making decisions, setting rules, managing outcomes, is paradoxically the most alienated from the lived reality of the society they govern. They are, by definition, detached from the very cultural and organizational processes they are supposed to oversee. Approaching societal design from the perspective of a leader in fiction or ideology is not really about solving anything, it's just aurafarming.

A lot of what I've discussed in this document is, in some sense, about coping. National schizophrenia is not a coping mechanism per se, but it is connected in that it is an omnipresent, subconscious phenomenon that influences behavior and perception. Meanwhile, the struggle cult is clearly a form of cope, as is the mass, self-inflicted absurdism of youth, and even the act of imagining alternate realities or scenarios can be a coping mechanism. Personally, I am deeply invested in this kind of coping/wasting time. I indulge in it constantly. But when I try to think about society in practical terms, when I consider the possibility of organizing or improving the world in some concrete way, my approach is different. I genuinely want the best for everyone. I know how corny that sounds, especially in a world dominated by class and group interests, but my position as a social isolate, a total

loser in conventional terms, ironically gives me a freedom that most people don't have: I don't have a faction, a group identity, or personal stake in the usual hierarchies. That detachment allows me to imagine systems in which the primary goal is not advantage or power but functioning well and producing genuine satisfaction for as many people as possible. I'm bitter, yes, and cynical about many things, but the idea that let's make everyone suffer doesn't work for politics or administration which I have an autisticesce interest in. At the end of the day, my instinct, perhaps naïve, perhaps idealistic, is simple: I want systems that work, that make life smoother, more livable, and, yes, happier for everyone involved.

MEOWL

Why I chose this picture I'm not exactly sure.
I thought it fit the chaotic nature of the document
and it is kind of related to the
concept of cutification..

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Collection of rants about
National Schizophrenia,
Renativisation, Slop, Degeneracy,
Struggle cult and Cutification.
Chaotically organised but
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